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Abstract 
Twenty states and several cities have adopted their own EITC programs, typically piggy-backing 
on the federal EITC by offering benefits equal to some designated proportion of the federal 
benefits.  In all but four states, the state EITC is fully refundable, just like the Federal EITC.  
Using the example of Delaware, which adopted a non-refundable EITC in 2006, I show the 
peculiar distributional effects of such a policy.  Roughly the lower income half of the EITC 
recipient population is ineligible for the Delaware non-refundable EITC.  Married couples and 
both single-parent and two-parent families with less than two children also often lose eligibility 
and/or a substantial portion of benefits. The average benefit received by Federal EITC 
recipients falls by almost two-thirds. It is likely that these impacts of EITC non-refundability 
results would hold in other states considering such a policy.  




  The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has become the well-respected centerpiece of 
Federal income support policies of the 21
st century.  It now provides more than $35b to nearly 
20 million U.S. households.  Its key features are well-known:  benefits are based on earnings 
aggregated at the household level and thus are well-targeted; benefits are increasing or stable 
with respect to earnings through as much as the first $16,000 of earnings; and the tax credit is 
fully refundable if the credit exceeds taxes due.  This latter feature transforms the EITC from a 
program focused on tax relief to one focused on income support for poor and moderate income 
working families via the tax system. 
  The importance of this latter feature is easily seen in EITC statistics.  In 2004, the most 
recent year with full information, 90% of EITC payments were in the form of refundable credits 
received as a tax refund.  Without refundability, the EITC would have remained a small 
program.  
  Twenty states and several cities have adopted their own EITC programs, typically piggy-
backing on the federal EITC by offering benefits equal to some designated proportion of the 
federal benefits.  Typical percentages range from 10% to 25%.  Sixteen of the states have 
refundable programs, but four do not - Delaware, Iowa, Maine, and Virginia.  Interestingly, 
Delaware and Virginia both adopted their EITC programs in 2005, effective for the 2006 tax 
year.  Are non-refundable state EITCs the wave of the future? 
  The usual rationale for making a state EITC non-refundable is budgetary.  A non-
refundable EITC is not only less expensive directly, but it also avoids administrative costs 
associated with processing returns from households who, in the absence of a refundable 
program, do not need to file.  Less well appreciated are the perverse distributional effects of 
such a decision.  Who would design an income support program that channels its benefits to:  1) 
moderate-income workers at the expense of lower-income workers; 2) single parent families at   4 
the expense of married couple families with the same income; and 3) families with fewer 
children over families with more children, holding income constant?  A non-refundable state 
EITC does each of those things.   
  In this paper, I illustrate these issues generally and then with the specific example of the 
recent non-refundable EITC program instituted by Delaware.  I provide quantitative estimates of 
the distributional impact of the program design by analyzing data on Delawareans from the 2004 
American Community Survey. 
 
Background and Analysis 
  The Federal EITC provides benefits in the form of refundable tax credits to families on 
the basis of their earnings, their marital status, and their number of dependent children.  
Benefits increase with earnings over a “phase-in” range, are constant for some income range 
(the “stationary” range), and then fall with earnings, as in a typical means-tested assistance 
program (the “phase-out” range).  
  Single individuals or married couples without children are eligible for a 7.65% earnings 
subsidy, applied to the first $5,100 of earnings.
1  (All figures presented here are for 2004; the 
various incomes that define the three ranges are automatically adjusted each year for inflation.)  
One child increases the phase-in rate to 34% and the earnings to which it applies to $7,660.  As 
a result, the maximum credit increases from $390 to more than $2,600.  A second child 
increases the subsidy rate to 40 percent, and the applicable income to $10,750, thereby 
increasing the maximum credit to $4,300.  After a second child, however, there are no further 
benefits.  The benefit reduction rate is increased as the number of children increases, from 
7.65% for single persons or families with no children to 15.98% for families with one child and 
21.06% for families with two or more children.  Maximum benefits go to childless households 
with earnings between $5,100 and $11,490 ($12,490 if married), one-child families with 
                                                 
1 This credit is available only to persons between ages 25 and 64.   5 
earnings between $7,660 and $14,040 (if single) and $15,040 (if married), and families with two 
or more children and earnings between $11,000 and $14,040 (single) and $15,040 (married).
2  
For more information on the details of the Federal EITC, see Hoffman and Seidman.  
In a state with fully refundable EITC benefits at rate a, state EITC benefits are aBF where 
BF is the Federal EITC benefit.  The distribution of state EITC benefits exactly follows the federal 
distribution. There are no distributional effects.  
In a state with a non-refundable EITC program, benefits depend on the features of the 
EITC program and its tax system.  Almost universally, state taxes depend not only on household 
income, but also on marital status and the number of children.  These demographic features 
affect taxes through differential tax schedules and/or a different standard deduction and also 
through the simple arithmetic impact of additional personal exemptions.  In a typical state tax 
system, taxes are lower, holding income constant, for married couples and for couples with 
more children.  
With a non-refundable program, state EITC benefits are equal to the minimum of 
refundable benefits and taxes due.  Ironically, the more favorably the state tax system treats 
married-couple families relative to single-parent families and the more favorable is its 
adjustment for family size, the greater is the impact of non-refundability.  These state tax 
provisions offset the favorable treatment of married couples and families with more children in 
the Federal EITC program.  
The Delaware Case 
  As of early 2007, 20 states offered their own EITC, typically as some fraction of the 
Federal EITC
3.  EITCs in Delaware and Virginia were passed in 2005 and became effective in 
2006.  Michigan and Nebraska passed legislation in 2006; Nebraska’s became effective in 
2006, while Michigan’s will be effective beginning in 2008.  Table 1 includes the full list of states, 
                                                 
2 The $1000 extension of the stationary range for married couples was a feature of EGTRA 2001.  
3 In addition, three local governments — New York City, San Francisco, and Montgomery County, 
Maryland— offer local EITC programs.   6 
along with key features of each plan.  As seen there, the state EITC is fully or partially 
refundable in 16 of the 20 states.  The median benefit rate is 15%; DC, NY, VT, and MN all have 
benefit rates in excess of 30%.   
  Delaware’s EITC provides benefits equal to 20% of the Federal EITC, but it is non-
refundable. Virginia’s new EITC has the identical structure.  Delaware’s income tax system is 
moderately progressive, rising from a rate of 2.2% for taxable income between $2,000 and 
$5,000 to a rate of 5.95% for taxable income greater than $60,000.
4  An unusual feature of the 
Delaware tax system allows married couples to separate their income for purposes of 
computing tax liability and to allocate deductions proportional to the spousal distribution of total 
income.  As a result, a household’s tax liability depends on the spousal distribution of income.  
Taxes are always lower for a given income when the income is shared equally than when one 
spouse has all the income.  In lieu of a more conventional personal exemption, Delaware 
provides a non-refundable tax credit per person of $110.   
   Table 2 shows the key features of Delaware’s tax system and its non-refundable EITC.  
A married couple with one child and a single earner owes no taxes until its income exceeds 
$17,938.   At that income (assuming all income is earnings) it would be eligible for a Federal 
EITC of $2,140.  If DE’s EITC were refundable, it would receive $428, but instead it receives $0.  
If that same couple had two equal earners, it would owe no taxes -and receive no DE EITC 
benefit- until its income exceeded $21,564.  For a married couple with three children, the 
corresponding income levels are $4,583 greater with a single earner and $5,519 greater with 
two equal earners.  These families lose DE EITC benefits of $545 and $353, respectively.  A 
single parent owes no taxes until his/her income exceeds $12,199 if he/she has one child, 
$14,688 with two children, and almost $17,000 with three children.  These single-parent families 
lose EITC benefits of $820-$860.  
                                                 
4 Marginal tax rates in Virginia are similar to Delaware’s, ranging from 2% for taxable income up to $3,000 
to 5.75% for taxable income greater than $17,500.    7 
  The income ranges at which the maximum EITC benefit is received are shown in the 
second panel of the table.  The Federal maximums are those discussed above.  As a result of  
the interaction of the EITC with the DE income tax system, the maximum DE EITC is received 
by families with roughly $9,000-$20,000 more income than under a refundable EITC at the 
same rate.  For example, for married couples with two or three children and equal-earning 
spouses, the maximum DE EITC benefits go to families with incomes of nearly $30,000 and 
$31,000, respectively.  Single-parent families receive maximum DE EITC benefits at incomes 
ranging from about $19,500 to $25,000, depending on the number of children they have.  These 
incomes are substantially above the $14,050 figure for maximum federal EITC benefits for these 
single-parent families. 
  Holding income constant, larger families and married families receive fewer benefits, 
again due to the higher income levels at which positive taxation accrues.  These impacts arise 
not because of separate tax schedules, but simply reflect the tax impact of an additional 
personal exemption credit and/or larger standard deduction.  At a marginal tax rate of 4.8%, 
which applies to taxable income between $10,000 and $20,000, an additional exemption defers 
taxes on $2,292 of income; for families with taxable income between $20,000 and $25,000, an 
additional exemption defers income on $2,115 of income.   
Figure 1 shows the impact of marital status for families with two children and Figure 2 
the impact of additional children for married couples.  In both figures, I show the impacts for the 
case in which total family income is equally earned between husband and wife; other 
combinations of earnings would yield qualitatively similar results.  In Figure 1, the single-parent 
family begins to receive EITC benefits when its income reaches $14,688 and receives a 
maximum of $440 when its income reaches approximately $24,000.  At that income level, 
however, the married couple still owes no DE taxes and receives no DE EITC.  Beyond that 
income, the DE EITC for the married couple begins to rise, while the EITC for the single parent   8 
family falls.  For incomes above about $29,800, the married couple receives the larger EITC, 
about $42 more.    
  In Figure 2, the effect of having an additional child is to push the EITC schedule to the 
right toward higher income thresholds.  For example, at an income of $26,000, a married couple 
with one child would receive a DE EITC of $171, while a married couple with two children would 
get $63 and one with three or more children would get nothing.  Since the official needs 
standard rises with the number of children, larger families have a lower real income at any 
nominal income level.  The Federal EITC recognizes this to some degree by increasing the 
subsidy rate with the number of children through two.  The non-refundability eliminates this 
consideration.  At incomes above about $29,000, this odd marital status effect is reversed.  
Married couples with three children never receive more than married couples with two children. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
  Data and Methods. To examine the actual impact of the DE non-refundable EITC, I drew 
a sample of Delaware households from the 2004 American Community Survey (ACS).  The 
ACS is a new Census Bureau annual survey that is intended to replace the Census long form by 
collecting the detailed demographic, socioeconomic, and housing information traditionally 
collected in the Census. When fully implemented in 2010, the ACS will sample about three 
million addresses annually. For more information about the ACS, see Census Bureau, 2006. 
The Delaware portion of the ACS sample includes 10,170 persons who resided in 4,200 
non-vacant housing units.  For each housing unit, the ACS includes information about the 
earnings and income of each individual residing there, including specific sources of income 
(self-employment, interest income, SSI, retirement income, public assistance, etc).  The ACS 
also includes the basic demographic information (age, marital status, number and ages of 
dependent children) needed to compute EITC benefits and DE taxes.  All information is reported 
by a single person (the “reference person”).  The earnings and income reported in this way are   9 
not necessarily identical to that reported on IRS Form 1040, but they should be strongly 
correlated.  
  The major difficulty in using housing unit data to evaluate taxes and EITC receipt is 
identifying multiple tax-filing units within housing units.  A single housing unit may contain 
multiple families (technically, sub-families) as well as adult children, each of whom may file 
separate tax returns.  Aggregating income over all members of a housing unit causes two 
problems:  first, some tax-filing units are not identified at all and second, as a result, their 
income and dependent children may be inappropriately attributed to the primary family.  These 
problems can obviously affect the accurate estimation of taxes and EITC receipt.  
  While there is no perfect solution to this, I proceed by identifying all subfamilies and all 
adults over age 20 who are not the spouse of the reference person; adults and children in 
subfamilies can be identified through a Subfamily Relationship variable and a variable that 
indicates an individual’s relationship to the reference person.  This allows me to aggregate 
earnings, income, and the number of dependents within likely tax-filing units, rather than at the 
housing unit level.    
  I further make an assessment about whether a potential tax-filing unit would actually file 
a tax return.  I assumed that all units with earnings would file a return, both because of probable 
tax withholding and because the Federal EITC can be received only by filing a tax return.  For 
tax units without earnings, I computed the taxable income threshold at which they would need to 
file a return as the sum of the appropriate standard deduction for their marital status and the 
value of personal exemptions.  I assumed that all units with income below this threshold did not 
file.  
  These adjustments appear to have produced a very close approximation of the 
Delaware tax-filing population.  From the original 4,200 occupied housing units, I identified a 
total of 5,293 independent tax-filing units.  Of these, 4,938 met the filing criteria.   After applying 
the sample ACS weights, these 4,938 tax filers represent 390,133 Delaware tax filers.  Official   10 
IRS tabulations (IRS, 2004) show 395,657 individual tax returns for Delaware in 2004, 1.4% 
more than the number I identify.  My sample includes a total of 758,854 exemptions; the official 
IRS report shows 762,167.  These comparisons suggest that my procedures do a very credible 
job of identifying Delaware tax filers.  
  I compute DE taxes by assuming that all households take the standard deduction. This 
is probably a reasonable assumption for families eligible for the EITC, which is limited to families 
with income less than approximately $35,000.  I follow the DE tax code by allocating deductions 
to spouses proportionately by their share of income.  I use 2004 tax and EITC program values.  
   Findings.  11.6 percent of Delaware taxpayers qualify for the Federal EITC, but only 
6.1% of them –just over half-- qualify for the Delaware EITC.  The average DE EITC is $155; 
with full refundability, the average would have been $243, an increase of 56%.   On average, 
families who qualified for the Federal EITC received a DE EITC that was $161 less than if the 
credit had been fully refundable.  This figure includes the full loss to families who were ineligible 
for the DE program and the reduced benefits to those who retained eligibility.  The average 
EITC loss for this latter group was $95, more than 60% of the average benefit they did receive.  
  Non-refundability changes the program population and the distribution of benefits in 
distinct ways, consistent with the discussion above.  Table 3 shows some of these impacts.  The 
most dramatic is the change in the distribution by family income.  If the DE credit were 
refundable, more than half of the recipients and 40 percent of the credits would have gone to 
families with incomes under $15,000.  Instead, with the non-refundable credit, these families 
account for just one-quarter of the recipient population and less than one-twentieth of the total 
credits.  The distribution shifts strongly toward families with income between $25,000 and 
$35,000 (the program eligibility maximum):  their share of recipients nearly doubles and their 
share of credits nearly triples.  
  Non-refundability does not have an impact on the marital status distribution of the 
recipient population, but it does redistribute benefits from married couples to unmarried (never-  11 
married, divorced/separated, or widowed).  The share of total benefits going to married couples 
drops 30%, from 30.1% to 20.8%.  Non-refundability eliminates more than half of potential 
recipients without children and eliminates almost all of their benefits.  This is a function of the 
low maximum benefits for which they would be eligible ($78 = 20% x $390, the Federal 
maximum EITC) and the short range between the beginning of the DE tax range for single 
persons ($9,500) and the maximum income for eligibility (less than either $11,490 or $12,490, 
depending on marital status).  Families with one child also are hurt:  their share of the recipient 
population falls by more than one-quarter and their share of benefits falls by one-fifth.  The lack 
of refundability has no impact on either the distribution of recipients or benefit shares by racial 
groups.  
 
Summary and Recommendations 
  I have shown by example and with empirical data that a non-refundable state EITC 
generates distributional impacts that do not appear well-conceived or well-designed.  Roughly 
the lower income half of the EITC recipient population is ineligible for the Delaware non-
refundable EITC; it is probable that the impact in a state like Virginia is similar.  Married couples 
and both single-parent and two-parent families with less than two children also often lose 
eligibility and/or a substantial portion of benefits.  In all, only about 60% of potential EITC 
recipients remain eligible. The average benefit received by Federal EITC recipients falls by 
almost two-thirds. 
 The design of Delaware’s tax system is similar to many other states.  It is moderately 
progressive and incorporates a substantial difference in the standard deduction by marital 
status.  Unusual features include allowing spouses to separate their incomes and using a non-
refundable tax credit for personal exemptions in lieu of a deduction from income, but these 
features do not fundamentally affect the impact of EITC non-refundability.  It is, therefore, likely   12 
that the Delaware impacts of EITC non-refundability results would hold in many other states with 
conventional tax systems.   
  Treating the EITC as tax relief, as in a non-refundable EITC, rather than income support 
operating through the tax system eliminates many of the advantages of a the EITC program.  A 
revenue-neutral refundable alternative to a non-refundable state EITC is not difficult to design 
and is far better targeted at the neediest EITC recipients.    13 
Table 1.  Characteristics of State EITC Plans, 2006 
  
Credit Rate as Percent of 
Federal EITC  Refundable 
Delaware  20%  No 
District of Columbia  35%  Yes 
Indiana
a  6%  Yes 
Illinois  5.0%  Yes 
Iowa  6.5%  No 
Kansas  15%  Yes 
Maine  5%  No 
Maryland
b  20%  Yes 
Massachusetts  15%  Yes 
Michigan
c  10%  Yes 
Minnesota
d  33%  Yes 
Nebraska  8%  Yes 
New Jersey
e  20%  Yes 
New York  30%  Yes 
Oklahoma  5%  Yes 
Oregon  5%  Yes 
Rhode Island  25%  Partially
f 
Vermont  32%  Yes 
Virginia  20%  No 
Wisconsin
c  14%  Yes 
     
Average  16%   
Median  15%   
a Refundable for households with qualifying children only. Others are nonrefundable. 
b Fully refundable only for households with children.  
c Percentage shown is average; credit rate depends on income and number of 
qualifying children 
d Effective Jan. 1, 2008; 20% rate effective, Jan. 1, 2009. 
e Only for households with qualifying children & incomes under $20,000. 
f Small percentage of the state EITC is refundable for some recipients. 
 
Source: Okwuje and Johnson 
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  Table 2.  The Interaction of DE State Taxes and Non-Refundable EITC Benefits, 2004  
 
 
Panel A.  Income at which a household first owes DE taxes 
 
Married  1 Child  2 Children  3 Children 
  One spouse has all income  $17,938  $20,229  $22,521 
 
Spouses have equal 
income  $21,564  $24,384  $27,083 
Single  $12,199  $14,688  $16,979 
 
 
Panel B.  Income at which a Household Receives Maximum EITC 
Married  1 Child  2 Children  3 Children  
  Federal  $7,660-$15,040  $11,000-$15,040  $11,000-$15,040 
  DE, one spouse has all 
earnings  $23,293   $27,311   $28,479  
  DE, spouses have equal 
earnings  $25,838   $29,777   $31,000  
Single       
  Federal  $7,660-$14,040  $11,000-$14,040  $11,000-$14,040 
  DE  $19,563   $23,925   $25,067  
   
Note:  All calculations based on 2004 EITC and DE income tax schedules. 
   15 
 
Table 3.  Impact of Delaware EITC Non-Refundability on EITC Receipt and Benefits 
 
  % of Recipients   % of Credits  
 
  Non-Refundable  Refundable  Non-Refundable  Refundable 
Family Income 
    < $15,000 
    $15,000-$25,000 
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Source:  Author calculations from 2004 ACS.  16 
 
 Figure 1. DE EITC Benefits by Income and Marital Status, 


























 Figure 2. DE EITC Benefits by Income and Number of 
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